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This paper will discuss the aspects of constitutional tinkering and its impact on democratic institutions by looking into 
the constitutional tinkering in the Nigerian constitution and its impact on democratic institutions focusing mainly on 
the electoral system. As a caveat, this paper focuses on the electoral process within an electoral system and not the 
methods by which election systems are determined. Thus, the paper focuses on the administration of elections and not 
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Constitutional Tinkering and Democratic Institutions: A Case Study of the 2019 Nigerian 
Electoral Process 
Introduction 
    “While you can have elections without a democracy, you cannot have a democracy without 
elections.” Michael Bratton states this in his study of African elections.1 In his paper, “Second 
elections in Africa,” he discusses the phenomena of analyzing the second set of elections in African 
nation post-decolonization as a measure of the success of democracy in the nation.2 It is often taken 
as an indication of a transfer of power and authority. In this field of study, Bratton and others have 
shown the importance of an electoral system in the functioning of a democratic administration 
particularly, the consolidation of democracy in a nation. As Bratton argues in his paper, elections do 
not constitute a consolidated democracy but they are a necessary institution as part of an array 
of institutions that are needed for a successful democratic state.3 Noting the importance of elections 
and their systems, electoral institutions and processes are equally important. How these elections 
are controlled, managed and executed are vital aspects of the electoral system. In many nations 
around the world, such processes find their origin in the constitution. As with post-colonial African 
governments, constitutions formed an integral part of the independence process. Electoral processes 
are outlined in the constitution and are the products of the constitutional process. The development 
of electoral systems is an important example to use in analyzing the impact of 
constitutional tinkering on democratic institutions.  
This paper will discuss the aspects of constitutional tinkering and its impact on democratic 
institutions by looking into the constitutional tinkering in the Nigerian constitution and its impact 
on democratic institutions focusing mainly on the electoral system. As a caveat, this paper focuses 
on the electoral process within an electoral system and not the methods by which election systems 
are determined. Thus, the paper focuses on the administration of elections and not the system by 
which votes are to be cast such as plurality method, approval voting or simple majority 
vote. Although the latter systems have a significant impact as to the outcomes of an election, the 
more fundamental question concerning constitutional design is the method by which these elections 
are administered and conducted. Though it is all well and good to have an innovative way of filling 
seats in Parliament or electing the executive candidates, it may have little impact where there is an 
inefficient system for counting these votes, encouraging voter turnout, providing campaign 






Constitutional Tinkering and Comparative Constitutional Design 
Overview 
 
1 Michael Bratton, Second Elections in Africa, 9 J. Dem. 51-66, 52 (1998).  
2 Id.  
3 Id. Bratton ultimately argues that second elections far exceed the importance of the watershed first round of 
elections that signal the consolidation of democracy. His theory states that thus, second elections specifically 
speak to the survival of these fledgling democracies and not merely consolidation.  
4 See Raphael López-Pintor, Electoral Management Bodies as Institutions of Governance, U.N. Dev. Program, 
https://bit.ly/2LU54Vz. This is a comprehensive analysis of the electoral management bodies all over the world.  
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“Constitution? Wetin be dat? Me a never see constitution before o. Na wetin e bi?”5 “it is a 
political mistake to call the document they are handing over a constitution. This is because, it has 
nothing to do with the will of the people of Nigeria. It was done based on the way the military wants 
it, it is only a guideline and therefore citizens should regard it as a guideline.”6 “We need to bring 
these nationalities around a conference table to discuss how we are going to live together as a 
country. As it is today, we are not a nation yet, we are a state.”7 “ The only effective solution to these 
agitations is in transparent, people-oriented government that is responsible and responsive to the 
needs of the governed.”8 Nigeria has had eight constitutions. The first four were enforced and 
developed prior to its independence and the latter four are post-independence with significant 
suspensions due to military rule. In contrast, the US has maintained a single constitution albeit with 
a slew of major amendments, for 230 years.  
There is significant debate concerning whether the constitutions that are edited, updated and 
amended lead to a more stable government than those that are not.9 It is of such significant 
conversation that political science students are taught the connection between rigid and flexible 
constitutions and how these are related to the administration of the government  and are in fact, tied 
to the character and expression of the state itself. For example, it is taught that the United Kingdom 
operates with an unwritten and flexible constitution that accords with their parliamentary system of 
government that permits for quick changes to constitutional norms.10 The arguments surrounding 
constitutional tinkering and constitutional design form the core of this essay. Here, this essay seeks 




In this section, we seek to define the phenomena of constitutional tinkering and how it may 
apply in our main discussion on the application of such values on the Nigerian constitution as it 
pertains to the electoral process. In this discussion, several questions first arise; are modifications 
or amendments examples of tinkering or must there be a constitutional death for the tinkering to 
arise? Should such tinkering be the norm, that is, is there a number of years after which a 
constitution seems to be optimal and as such, there should be a reevaluation of its usefulness? What 
are the benefits of tinkering? The drawbacks? Is there a process the tinkering must follow and who 
are the principal actors in this space? To answer the question of what constitutional tinkering is, 
there must be discussion as to what the purpose is of constitutions. It has been made clear that in 
 
5 Julius O. Ihonvbere, How to Make an Undemocratic Constitution, 21 Third World Quarterly, 341-366, 341 (2000). 
This quote is a response from a Nigerian taxi driver to the question, ‘Have you ever seen the Nigerian 
Constitution?’ Translation, “Constitution? What is that? I have never seen a constitution before. What is it?” 
6 Alhaji Balarabe Musa, quoted in Saxone Akhaine, Musa urges legislators to reject constitution, Association for 
Nigerian Scholars for Dialogue (1999).  
7 Prof. B.O. Nwabueze, quoted in New African Magazine, Nigeria: Nine Constitutions in 24 years of democracy! (25th 
Nov. 2013) The article title is misleading. At this point, Nigeria celebrating its 53rd anniversary and this article 
comes as the President, Goodluck Johnathan was considering yet another constitution to replace the 1999 
constitution. This constitution was never formed.  
8 Dr. David Ononogbu quoted in New African Magazine, Nigeria: Nine Constitutions in 24 years of democracy! (25th 
Nov. 2013).  
9 See for example, ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL 
CONSTITUTIONS 12 (2009); See also GEDION TIMOTHEWOS HESSEBON, CONTEXTUALIZING 
CONSTITUTIONALISM 185 (2017).  
10 See John Baker, The Unwritten Constitution of the United Kingdom, 15 ECCLESIASTICAL L. J., 4-27, (2013).  
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our modern governance, constitutions are a precursor to statehood.11 More strongly, they are vital to 
the survival of a state no matter the form they exist in.12  
A more interesting question is why? Constitutions did not really exist as formal legal documents 
until 1789 with the establishment of the official US Constitution. So, why are they so ubiquitous 
now? There are two forms of this answer; the first is more economical and defined by the 
constraints of rational actors, the second is more sociological and defined by the whims of history 
and the cultural factors that affected the decisions of states at the time post-1789.  
 
Constraints of rational actors  
Where a constitution is found, there is likely to be some form of a democracy existing. 
Following this logic, constitutions serve as a constraint to the rational majority power. By limiting 
choice and only providing for evaluation of relevant factors, constitutions promote democracy by 
ensuring that representation is protected.13 This is a brief explanation of this view. However, this 
view makes the following assumptions that aid in understanding the importance of constitutions. 
The rules provided by the constitution also pass a double check, they must be acceptable by 
the majority and they must be reasonable. Equally important is the check they provide for 
the minority view and the subsequent enhancement of the systems by which constitutional values 
are facilitated such as a strong judiciary and electoral system. Another aspect of this view is that it 
further shows that the constitution must further the ultimate goal of a democracy when it comes to 
rulemaking; that is, the Kantian goal of presenting a standard that no one has a reasonable argument 
to reject.14 Functioning in this manner, constitutions encourage debate on core issues and force 
information into the public sphere. As a result of this, it is evident that the limits and constraints are 
necessary conditions of constitutions and form their purpose. With the abundance of 
choice available for manners in which to govern, the constitution encourages the double 
check which necessarily eliminates those that do not pass the check. 
 
Sociological Discussion 
When discussing the purpose of a constitution, to outline the definition of 
constitutional tinkering and its importance to Nigerian constitutional development, 
these sociological and cultural factors come to the fore. A constitution born out of the necessity to 
dethrone colonialism and establish a constrained independence is not the work of rational actors and 
its purpose cannot be explained by the formulation described in the previous section. The rational 
majority power is not constrained but rather constrains. There is no evaluation of relevant factors as 
there is no common discussion of varying views. Views are not varied where the constitution is 
a necessity for independence.  
 
The Definition of Constitutional Tinkering 
Where this is the defined purpose of constitutions, then the constitutional tinkering process must 
provide and encourage this purpose and not detract from it. In fact, it may be said that where the 
tinkering does not further this purpose, it actually serves to encourage the direct opposite of the 
democratic nature of constitutions which is the death of the constitution through autocratic rule.15  
 
 
11 See n10 infra. There are some states that do not have codified constitutions such as the UK and yet, it may still 
be the case that these uncodified constitutions provide some guidance to statehood.  
12 See NILS KARLSEN, JAMES BUCHANAN, WHY CONSTITUTIONS MATTER, 20 (2017).  
13 Id at 5.  
14 Id.  
15 See for example, Lydia Gall, Hungary’s Latest Assault on the Judiciary, Human Rights Watch (14th Dec. 2018).  
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Tinkering thus, involves considerations and changes affecting democratic participation, 
economic development, national unity and political stability. More importantly, it serves to update 
outmoded institutions. Where any of these goals are effected through the a constitutional change, 
the constitution has been successfully tinkered with. Thus, these goals form our guideposts in 
analyzing the constitutional tinkering occurring in the context of elections.  
 
An Analysis of Constitutional Tinkering in West Africa 
Carrying out an empirical analysis of constitutional change gives some gravity and clarity as 
to the focus of this research. It helps narrow our analysis by bringing concrete examples of 
constitutional change and flesh out some of the external factors that may be affecting the rates of 
constitutional change in West African countries, including Nigeria. In addition, it aids in developing 
the lexicon for analyzing these constitutional changes and the importance of the delineation between 
amendments and replacements. 
 
Concrete Factors  
A preliminary analysis shows that there are 4 common factors in discussing the 
constitutional trends of West African states. These factors have been determined through a focus of 
the history of written constitutions of these states. As is the case with post-colonial states, written 
constitutions are the norm. However, there is a debate as to whether these constitutions form the 
fundamental aspect of determinant of governing within the state and whether there are other texts 
or norms that form a part of this? To this question, the answer in this paper is to focus, at 
this point on the quantifiable determinations on the fluctuations of the written constitutions in this 
context. As was evident in the relevant time period, outward, concrete and formalist expressions of 
statehood were key as was the implementation of a constitution. In this respect, 
therefore, considerations of the various promulgated constitutions will be fundamental in 
determining their impact on democratic institutions.  
 
1. The phenomena of Independence Constitutions  
15 of the 16 West African states, this number is based on the UN’s description of West 
Africa, have what I have determined as Independence Constitutions.16 These are constitutions 
enacted solely to achieve independence from colonial powers. The only state not to have such 
a constitution is Liberia as Liberia was not founded by African-Americans in the 1820s.17 These 
independence constitutions have a few commonalities. They are threadbare in their provisions, 
most highlighting the core debates surrounding independence and the core bargaining faced in the 
negotiations with the colonizing powers. At this point, it is important to give a few 
historical distinctions with the West African countries here. Consistently, there are three major 
colonial powers at play: The United Kingdom, France and Portugal.18 The United Kingdom 
 
16 See United Nations of West Africa, Map of West Africa, UNOWAS, https://unowa.unmissions.org/map (last 
accessed Nov. 2019).  
17 Angela Thompsell, A Brief History of the African Country of Liberia, ThoughtCo., https://bit.ly/2RVnMQj (13th 
Feb. 2018).  
18 Cf Nwando Achebe, Colonial Rule in West Africa, West African Senior School Certificate Examination History 
Textbook, https://bit.ly/2EewHnU (last accessed Nov. 2019). This analysis argues that the major powers also 
include Germany and Belgium. Though these were major powers in the establishment of colonial power in the 
region, they were not the major powers that eventually led to decolonization in the region post- WWII.  
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colonized: Nigeria, Ghana, Sierra Leone and The Gambia;19 France colonized: Guinea, Mauritania, 
Benin, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Burkina Faso, Cote d’Ivoire, Togo; Portugal colonized Cabo Verde and 
Guinea-Bissau.20 For the Portuguese sphere of influence, independence came as a result of 
Portugal’s Carnation Revolution, Revolução dos Cravos, in 1974.21 Where a military coup in Lisbon 
overthrew the Estada Novo regime, the resulting political shift emphasized the need to secure the 
independence of the African nations in the Portuguese empire.22 Thereafter in 1975, Cabo Verde 
achieved a negotiated independence alongside Angola, Mozambique and Sao Tome and Principe.23 
Guinea-Bissau tells a different story with a violent, worker-led revolution against the Portuguese 
government beginning in 1956 and culminating with a unilateral declaration of independence in 
1973, the year prior to the Carnation Revolution in 1974.24 In 1974, however, following the change 
in Portuguese government, the Portuguese troops were removed from Guinea-Bissau and their 
independence was officially recognized.25  
    For French and British West Africa, it was a different tale. Independence was negotiated with the 
French government following an overwhelming campaign by activists such as Ahmed Sekou Touré 
of Guinea and Leopold Sédar Senghor of Senegal.26 The same was done with the Crown by activists 
such as Kwame Nkrumah. Thus, these independence constitutions serve a very formalist purpose on 
the cusp of new government. In a similar manner to the experience of the United States and their 
Articles of Confederation  these constitutions needed to show independence and preparation 
of international engagement whilst providing hope to the newly minted citizens without enhancing 
strife or discontent. They had a tough job and were all unsuccessful. Noticeably, they were based on 
the constitutions of their correspondent colonial powers. They adopted their forms of government 
and the rights attendant in them. One thing is also clear, these constitutions served the bare 
minimum to achieve statehood with the UN. The UN being an important indicator of true 
independence in the ‘50s and ‘60s, these constitutions bore provisions that were akin to the UN 
Declaration of Human Rights and the UN Charter, the core founding documents of what has been 
argued by some as the formation of an international constitution.  
2. Coups, Civil Wars and Other Disruptions 
As quickly as these constitutions were formed, they were replaced. The West African 
countries, save for Cabo Verde and including Liberia, have all suffered through a coup or civil war 
or other political disruption resulting regime change.27 This section gets into the question of to what 
 
19 See Amy Tikkanen, British West Africa, Encyclopedia Britannica, https://www.britannica.com/place/British-
West-Africa (2nd March 2012) 
20 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, French West Africa, Encyclopedia Britannica, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/French-West-Africa (20th Jul. 1998) 
21 See John Paton Davies, Revolution of the Red Carnations, New York Times, https://nyti.ms/2rArrsd (13th Jul. 
1975).  
22 Id.  
23 The Editors of Encyclopedia Britannica, The New State After Salazar, Encyclopedia Britannica, 
https://www.britannica.com/place/Portugal (14th Dec. 2019) 
24 Id.  
25 Id.  
26 See Frederick Cooper, The Politics of Decolonization of French and British West Africa, 7-10, Oxford Research 
Encyclopedia (Jan. 2018).  
27 See Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research Data Page, Center for Systemic Peace, 
https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (last accessed Nov. 2019), this page contains raw data on all 
coups from 1946-2018; See also Judd Devermont and Jon Temin, Africa’s Democratic Moment, Foreign Affairs, 
https://fam.ag/2PGzOKI, (Jul. 2019).   
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extent is constitutional change epiphenomenal? That is, to what extent was constitutional change 
affected by the regime change here? Following an Independence Constitution, constitutional change 
was often expected. However, coups present an interesting analysis. There have been 43 coups 
across West Africa since the various declarations of Independence in 1960.28 
The earliest coup occurred in Senegal in 1962 and the most recent was in Burkina Faso in 2015.29 
These preliminary figures seem to underscore what I had been taught in Government class in 
secondary school in Nigeria, coups bear a contagion effect, where one country experiences it, a 
neighboring country may just do the same. And indeed, the frequency and spread of these coups 
may echo this. In 1966, Ghana, Nigeria and Burkina Faso all experienced coups. Reflecting on the 
status of the constitutions at the time, the result is a mixed bag.  
The sustenance of a constitution during a coup is in effect determined by the coup itself, the 
reasons behind it, the purposes or objectives of the coup plotters and the impact of public 
participation. In some instances, the installed regimes promoted    the constitution, 
others suspended the constitution and operated by military decree and yet others used the coup as a 
tool for drafting a new constitution. At most, this research shows that “abrupt changes in regime, 
in the direction of either democracy or autocracy, will increase the probability of replacement.”30  
3. Constitutional Change Surrounding Necessary Rights and Perceived Governmental 
Inefficiencies 
Constitutional change surrounding substantive rights and governmental structure were very 
common in this period among the West African states. The constitutional changes were 
expected considering the laxity of the Independence Constitutions. These changes focused on 
changing their form of government, for example, several states changed from semi-presidential or 
parliamentary systems of government to presidential systems of government. A more popular area 
of substantive constitutional change concerned electoral processes such as changing from a one 
party to a multiparty state, term limits for Presidents and other attempts to maintain a position of 
power by the politicians in power. This is pertinent for the review conducted in this paper as it 
draws attention to the possible outcomes of constitutional tinkering when it comes to electoral 
processes. These states used their constitutions to effect this change as opposed to using Acts of 
parliament or other forms of legislation. This means that there is a perception of a staying power of 
constitutions and there is formality and legitimacy given to the composition of the constitution.   
4. Constitutional Referenda 
Finally, there is a commonality in the use of referenda in adopting a constitution. In these 
states, there have been referenda conducted to determine the entry into force of constitutions in the 
state. Constitution drafting commissions and assemblies were called and discussion on the terms of 
the constitution and the necessary change as discussed in the previous section that is reminiscent of 
talk surrounding Independence. In fact, in some cases, it is almost exactly similar as the parties 
involved remain largely the same. This is an example of how this constitutional tinkering also 
enhances democratic process. In most of these constitutional referenda, the voting populace has a 
 
28 See Integrated Network for Societal Conflict Research Data Page, Center for Systemic Peace, 
https://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html (last accessed Nov. 2019).  
29 Id.  
30 ZACHARY ELKINS, TOM GINSBURG & JAMES MELTON, THE ENDURANCE OF NATIONAL CONSTITUTIONS 
115 (2009) 
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direct say as to whether they support the proposed constitution. Even though, our contemporary 
example of the drawbacks of constitutional referenda is currently working its way through the public 
approval process, it is still a powerful tool of gauging the will of the public on an important issue as 
to the substance of the constitution.31 Here, we refer to the constitution itself. 
 
An Historical Analysis of Nigerian Constitutional Development  
The brief summary of constitutional change in West Africa shows that these states and 
Nigeria are no strangers to drastic change in constitutions. It also gives some insight into the 
phenomena discussed in the earlier sections on constitutional tinkering. Focusing more 
specifically, this paper turns to Nigeria’s constitutional development and the concrete 




This period saw the introduction of Nigeria’s first constitutions. These include the Clifford 
Constitution, the Richard Constitution, the Macpherson Constitution and the Lyttleton 
Constitution.33 It is from these constitutions that an underlying theme develops and permeates 
through all of Nigeria’s subsequent constitutions. Here is the evidence of the beginnings of 
regionalism and divisions of power along tribal and ethnic lines that serve as the crux of Nigeria’s 
post-independence constitutions.  
The first constitution , the Clifford Constitution in 1922 was developed in order to provide 
regulation and legislation for the southern part of the country.34 It established a Legislative Council 
and an Executive Council. However, it emphasized a regional structure. The south of the country 
would be governed by this Constitution and the various councils it established but the north of the 
country will remain governed by Proclamations issued by the Governor-General, at the time, Hugh 
Clifford. This was also the first constitution to include the elective principle and this meant that the 
Legislative and Executive councils bore elected seats.35 This was a major change in the colonial 
administration of the country at the time. It is important to note that the first major change 
enshrined in Nigeria’s first constitution involves the availability of elective seats on the national 
legislature. It also embodies the element of regionalism as this requirement was only extended to a 
few seats in the South.36 
The Richard Constitution that followed bore some of the same issues. Promulgated after World War 
II in 1946, the Constitution sought to provide greater self-determination for Nigerians and other 
Africans as well as provide a constitutional legislative framework that extended throughout the 
whole country and not just the southern portion.37 This came on the heels of several negotiations 
with the Crown Colony administration in Britain following the 1929 Aba Women’s Riots.38 In this 
 
31 See Zack Beauchamp, The Fall of Jeremy Corbyn: Why Labor lost – and what it means for Britain, Vox Media, 
https://bit.ly/35kbODS, (13th Dec. 2019).  
32 See John Ademola Yakubu, Trends in Constitution-Making in Nigeria, 10 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 424 
(2000). 
33 Id. The four pre-Independence constitutions were named after the colonial Governors-General that enforced 
their application.  
34 Id at 425.  
35 Id.  
36 Id. The North was excluded at the time as the British Colonial Government had a different means of governing 
the region.  
37 At the time, Eastern Nigeria comprised a small section of Western Cameroon as well.  
38 See Adaobi Onyekagbu, The real story behind the Aba Women’s Riot and the list of people that died, Pulse NG, (8th Sept. 
2019).  
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constitution, of import was the establishment of the Regional Houses of Assembly that saw the 
participation of Nigerians but again, the regional division of legislative power.  
 
This was clamored for in the 1951 MacPherson Constitution. At this point, those who would 
advocate for Nigerian independence had enjoyed the opportunity to participate in the 
decisionmaking for the country and sought a greater extension of those powers as a precursor to 
independence.39 There were several calls for an African-majority Legislative Council, which had 
emerged as the central administrative council in charge of coordination of the regional bodies. Thus, 
this constitution featured the establishment of a National Assembly comprised of the House of 
Representatives which functioned as Nigeria’s central legislature and a central executive council 
known as the Council of Ministers. This structure was also applied at the regional level. The last 
constitution before independence was the Lyttleton constitution.40 Here, the elements of a loose 
federal system of government were instituted. Thus, each region was given a form of sovereign 
status, a confederation of states within Nigeria. A move that would greatly exacerbate the regional 
divisions within the country.  
 
Independence Constitution 1960  
 
As previously mentioned, independence constitutions are important. However, they are not 
so for their content but for what they represent. The independence constitution 
represents validation and confirmation of a new state as well as acknowledgment of self-
determination in some form. Negotiated independence constitutions were made to be changed. 
Nigeria’s is no different. This is because the sovereignty negotiated at independence is not 
sovereignty belonging to the new state but sovereignty protected and enforced by the colonial 
power.41 At the time of Nigeria’s independence, the Crown maintained control over their legislature. 
This means that the bills could not become law without the Queen’s approval.42 The Queen 
remained the head of State and as such, all executive functions were carried out in her name. Finally, 
the Queen played a role in the approval of the appointment of judges and could provide discrete 
forms of relief in the criminal justice system such as entering a nolle prosequi order and offering 
political pardon.43 In addition, final appeal was referred to the Privy Council in the UK. Thus, this 
country may have established a form of independence but left serious questions about the extent 
to which sovereignty may have been guaranteed.  
The most important aspect of the independence aspect of the constitution was as an example of its 
importance as a defining document. The first section of the document is the supremacy clause. It 
states that,  
 
the Constitution shall have the force of law throughout Nigeria and, subject to the provisions of 
Section 4 of this Constitution, if any other law (including the constitution of a region) is inconsistent 
with this Constitution shall prevail and the other law shall, to the extent of the inconsistency, 
be void.44  
 
 
39 See John Ademola Yakubu, Trends in Constitution-Making in Nigeria, 10 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 426 
(2000). 
40 Id.  
41 See B.O. NWABUEZE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA, 72-73 (1982).  
42 Id at 74.  
43 Id at 75.  
44 NIG. CONST. (1960) §1.  
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This showed their readiness to seek independence. In 1957, a debate raged in the Nigeria House 
of Representatives on when to seek in Independence.45 
 The motion before the House sought that the delegates to be sent to London for the Nigerian 
Constitutional Conference should seek Independence for later that same year in 1957.46 However, 
the House of Representatives expressed concerns at these debates that are eerily premonitory of the 
constitutional history that would result post-Independence. In advocating for a later date of 
Independence so as to have more time to plan for independence, then Minister of Transport, later 
the first Prime Minister of Nigeria, Hon. Abubakar Tafawa Balewa stated that,  
 
we will cherish the plea that the development of a federal system of government in any 
country largely depends on the even progress of the units comprising the Federation… Man 
at times, Sir, is by nature suspicious, and it is therefore natural for the people of the North, 
though greater than the South in numerical strength, to fear domination.47 
 
Here, his concerns reflect the entrenchment of regionalism and the fear that administration as an 
independent nation has left about the individual administration of the various regions. These fears 
would come to a head less than six years later when he was assassinated during a military coup 
organized by military members from the South of the country.  
In advocating for the same outcome, Mr. Jaja Wachuku, Representative of Aba in the House of 
Representatives, later the first Speaker of the House of Representatives, first Ambassador to the UN 
and the first Foreign Minister of Nigeria, stated that,  
 
we are realistic enough to appreciate that the problem of government is not like putting off 
your suit and putting it on again. There is certain preparatory work that must be done… Sir, 
we must prepare for independence. If we do not want to become a laughingstock to 
the world, we must prepare for this independence.48 
 
This preparation that Mr. Wachuku spoke of included the Independence Constitution. As 
is necessary in seeking independence, there is a relevant global stage and this constitution was an 
opportunity to explain the success of independence to the world at large, although this may have 
been short lived at the time.  
Finally, Mallam Shehu Shagari, then Representative of South-West Sokoto to the House of 
Representatives, later the first democratically elected President of Nigeria, summed up the necessity 
of a proper plan for independence. He said,  
 
Nigeria to-day has reached a stage in its political development when our responsible citizens 
must realize that the achievement of freedom or self-government or independence … is not 
an end in itself. It is not even a means to an end but only an awakening to the realization of 
greater responsibilities, immense sacrifices and still desirous of unlimited courage. It is high 
time we put up our plans for an independent Nigeria. Until this is done, all talk about such 
freedom or independence is merely empty.49 
 
45 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF NIGERIA, NIGERIA DEBATES INDEPENDENCE ON 26 MARCH 1957 AS RECORDED 
IN THE OFFICIAL REPORT (1957).  
46 Id.  
47 Id at 17.  
48 Id at 12.  
49 HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES OF NIGERIA, NIGERIA DEBATES INDEPENDENCE ON 26 MARCH 1957 AS RECORDED 
IN THE OFFICIAL REPORT 48-9 (1957) 
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Practically, the Independence Constitution also foreshadowed difficulties that will arise 
regarding the elections process. There was a section of the Constitution that concerned matters that 
were insulated from control by ministers. This established that the conduct of legislative elections 
was to be entrusted to independent commissions, the electoral commissions established directly by 
the Constitution for the federation and for each region. It explicitly stated that in the conduct of 
elections, each commission shall be free from control by any other person or authority. There were 
some exceptions for officers from the appropriate houses of legislature for the delimitation of voter 
constituencies. Finally, it provided for the involvement of both the executive and legislature in the 
appointment of persons to form the election committee. It also prevented removal except for cause, 
that is inability or misbehavior.50  
  
Republican Constitution of 1963  
This constitution marks a change in the system of government in Nigeria. “One of the most 
significant changes made by the 1963 Constitution was to sweep away the imperial basis of the pre-
existing constitution.”51 The change from monarchy to republic is significant in our analysis as this 
marked a definite attempt for autonomous rule within the nation. From here on, constitutions 
developed would be based on a derivation of legitimacy that was not guaranteed by the British 
government but by the will of the Nigerian people.52 In establishing a break from monarchical 
government, this constitution introduced a President of the Republic who was the Head of State and 
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces. Thus, vesting the executive authority retained by the 
Queen within the Nigerian government.53 It vested the judicial power retained by the Privy Council 
in the UK, in the newly created Supreme Court of Nigeria. Finally, it removed the legislative 
approval power retained by the British government and created a veto system with the Executive 
and the Legislature. It also sought to provide a federal system of government for the country. 54 
This is important in establishing concepts of separation of powers and the nature of the 
various governmental branches. This constitution retained the same features of the 1960 
Constitution with regards to the insulation of particular organs of government from influence by 
the executive, legislative and judicial branches. It also maintained a parliamentary system of 
government.55 
 
Constitution of Military Government  
Military government is complex because it is based on and full of contradictions. In Nigeria’s 
case, military rule poses a lot of constitutional issues particularly those regarding the legitimacy of 
military decrees, actions to be taken against those who plotted the coup (so called, "coup plotters”), 
transition from military to civilian rule and finally, resolution of conflicts between military decrees 
and existing constitutional provisions. Although there have been 8 coups in Nigeria’s history, the 
first presents the most interesting constitutional question and illustrates the main arguments of this 
paper. On January 15th, 1966, a coup was executed by disgruntled young majors within the Nigerian 
army led by the charismatic Major Chukwuemeka Kaduna Nzeogwu.56 He gathered a small force of 
other majors and officers of similar rank and assassinated the Prime Minister, Alhaji Tafawa Balewa, 
 
50 See B.O. NWABUEZE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA, 121 (1982). 
51 Id at 89.  
52 Id at 90. This section has an interesting discussion on autochthonous constitutions in the Nigerian context.  
53 Id.  
54 Id.  
55 Id.  
56 See John Ademola Yakubu, Trends in Constitution-Making in Nigeria, 10 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 441 (2000). 
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the Premier of the Northern Region, Alhaji Ahmadu Bello, the Premier of the Western Region, 
Chief Samuel Ladoke Akintola and the Minister of Finance, Chief Festus Okotie-Eboh.57 
 The reasons for this coup begin with the controversy surrounding the 1964 national 
elections. These elections embodied the issues with the administration of the government and the 
electoral process that plague Nigeria today. The political parties were not national in character but 
regional. The elections of 1959 did not leave any party with a majority. Thus, two parties formed 
a coalition, the Northern Peoples’ Congress (“NPC”) and the National Convention of Nigerian 
Citizens (“NCNC”) under the leadership of Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe. This formulation was unlikely 
given the tribes represented but created a path for integration of Northern and Southern tribes.58 
This coalition held together under the mutual hostility towards the Action Group (‘AG”) party.59 A 
new state was carved out of their region which exacerbated tensions in the region. In 1962, a state of 
emergency was declared in the region and several prominent AG party members were arrested. As a 
result of all this, the party was devastated.60 This crisis led to a realignment of the political parties 
bringing the United Progressive Grand Alliance, (“UPGA”) and the Nigerian National Alliance 
(“NNA”) parties to the fore.61 These two parties would contest in the 1964 elections in addition to 
NCNC, NPC and AG. There was a reign of terror instigated by each party to gain votes in the 
election. This encouraged a widespread thuggery, vandalism and violence all throughout the days 
leading up to the election. This was so great that the NPC, AG and the NCNC all threatened to 
secede from the federation.62 As a result of this, the western region (now AG and UPGA) staged a 
boycott of the elections.63  
At this point, the elections were conducted amidst widespread violence and disruption. The 
results were disputed by all parties and there was a call for a cancellation of the results and a new 
election. The new election took place in 1965 but with continued disputes by all parties. It was this 
constant disruption and scrambling for power by all the major party leaders including, Alhaji 
Ahmadu Bello and others that spurred the coup in January 1966.64 The January 1966 Coup serves as 
a template for analyzing the other coups that occurred in Nigeria.  
An interesting case decided by the Nigerian Supreme Court in 1970 provides analysis into 
the January 1966 coup and the legal standing of the military government, the constitution and 
Nigeria’s sovereignty.65 In Lakanmi v. The Attorney-General (West), a public officer, not affiliated with 
the military, under the regime of Colonel Yakubu Gowon, (who became Head of State and Supreme 
Commander of the Armed Forces as the result of a coup in July of 1966), was cited for allegedly 
corrupt practices.66 A military commission of inquiry found him and others guilty of corruption and 
recommended the forfeiture of their assets to the Federal Military Government, (“FMG”). In 
contesting this in the Ibadan High Court, Lakanmi asserted that Public Officers Edict of 1967 under 
which the order of forfeiture was given was inconsistent with the Public Officers Edict of 1966.67 
 
57 Id.  
58 See Douglas G. Anglin, Brinksmanship in Nigeria: The Federal Elections of 1964-65, 20 Int’l. J. 173-188, 175 (Spring, 1965).  
59 Id.  
60 Id at 176.  
61 Id.  
62 Id at 178.  
63 Id at 182.  
64 See Douglas G. Anglin, Brinksmanship in Nigeria: The Federal Elections of 1964-65, 20 Int’l. J. 173-188, 183 (Spring, 1965). 
65 See B.O. NWABUEZE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA, 170 (1982). 
66 See Magna Juris, Analysis of Lakanmi v. AG Western States, Magna Juris Confraternity, https://bit.ly/35oGfZt, (27th 
Dec. 2016).  
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They asserted this position so as to invalidate the application of the decrees and retain 
Constitutional protections.68  
 
At the Nigerian Supreme Court, the issue raised was whether the Federal Military 
Government was a revolutionary government under which the Constitution bore no legal 
significance or a constitutional interim government that must ensure the continued existence of 
the constitution.69 In answering this question, the court determined that Lakanmi had successfully 
argued the necessity doctrine as applicable in this case. Here, the court stated that the hand-over 
of power to the armed forces took place by virtue of the necessity doctrine and so was consistent 
with the constitution.70 As such, the constitution must be upheld by the 
interim constitutional government. The necessity doctrine states that it was necessary as a matter 
of national emergency and exigent circumstances at the time of the coup for the civilian government 
to hand over power to a military government and this was done in order to preserve the sovereignty 
of the state.71 In rejecting the revolutionary government  claim, the court found that because those 
who effected the coup, (Major Kaduna Nzeogwu and others) were not connected to those who 
ultimately took power, (Major General Aguiyi-Ironsi), it is not the case that the Federal 
Military Government as it exists is a revolutionary government.72 The importance of then 
maintaining the constitution is then emphasized here. Even where violence, constitutional crises and 
military government had occurred, the constitution remained paramount. 
 
The court recognized that it cannot “expect that constitutions make provisions for all 
exigencies. No constitution can anticipate all the different forms of phenomena which may beset a 
nation.”73 The constitutional inquiry here continues to be interesting as the doctrine of necessity was 
read in as a legal and constitutional argument by virtue of the common law system. In effect, 
the judicial branch of the government is informing a military power of its constitutional validity 
using an extraconstitutional doctrine. Through that doctrine, the object here was to “save the state 
and society from destruction and if this can be done only by abdicating sovereign power to a body 
best able to achieve the object, then abdication of sovereignty ought to be within the permissible 
ambit of the doctrine.”74This further means that the FMG was handed the entire sovereignty of the 
state. Part and parcel of that sovereignty is the constitution. To then answer the issue in the case, the 
court then stated that the FMG had sufficiently established through military decree, its ability to 
create laws as well as its ability to amend the constitution. The latter power is not unfettered or 
limitless. It is governed by the doctrine of necessity as it existed at the time of the exigency. Thus, 
this particular decree seeking to amend the constitution and take such corruption claims out of 
the ambit of the judiciary is unconstitutional.  
 
This case is highlighted as an important illustration of not only the importance of the 
constitution, but the effectiveness of constitutional norms to ensure some form of democratic 
process. An underlying question and concept throughout the case was whether the existence of a 
constitution was as important or even more important than the retention of sovereignty. As this case 
 
68 The constitution referred to here is the 1963 Constitution.  
69 See Magna Juris, Analysis of Lakanmi v. AG Western States, Magna Juris Confraternity, https://bit.ly/35oGfZt, (27th 
Dec. 2016). 
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73 See B.O. NWABUEZE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA, 170 (1982). 
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describes, the answer is twofold. First, in Nigeria, the constitution here forms as a source of 
legitimacy for the government itself. You could say that in deciding in this manner, the court 
considered its own existence, for it would not be so but for the existence of the 
Constitution. Second, without the constitution, military decrees offer no accountability. Throughout 
the case’s procedural history, several decrees were issued to maintain the FMG’s power to issue such 
orders of forfeiture without judicial review. As in Marbury v. Madison, the case marks a daring 
intervention into the executive power but also, a strong endorsement for the applicability of the 
constitution.  
 
1979 Constitution  
Nigeria returned to civilian rule on October 1, 1979 with the adoption of the 
1979 Constitution. The main change here from the 1963 constitution is the switch from a 
parliamentary system  of government to a presidential system of government.75 This constitution 
showed the work of the Constituent Assembly which had been assembled by the 
immediately preceding military government led by General Olusegun Obasanjo (later President of 
Nigeria) The presidential system of government was chosen to combat the failings of the 
parliamentary system which had seen the state besieged by military overthrow and civil war all due to 
the previous civilian government’s inability to form a cohesive government at the 1964 elections. 
The perceived inefficiencies sought to be corrected by the presidential system include the following; 
conflict and instability arising from the separation of the head of the executive from the head 
of government, complexity and uncertainty of government relations and the weakening of leadership 
by collective power and responsibility. 
 In forms of solutions made in the presidential system adopted in the constitution,  Chapter II on 
the fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy embodies the ideals. In drafting 
this chapter at the Constituent Assembly, Prof. B.O. Nwabueze stated that,  
 
A constitution operating as law and imposing judicially enforceable restraints upon 
government should not abandon its other function as a source of legitimacy for those 
political concepts and governmental relations are, by their very nature non-justiciable. Nor 
should it renounce its role in the affirmation of fundamental objectives and ideals or 
directive principles of government which serve to inform and inspire governmental actions 
along desirable lines. It is in this combination of judicially enforceable restraints and the 
legitimation of needed non-justiciable government powers and relations that the singular 
achievement of the US Constitution lies.76 
 
 Here, Prof. Nwabueze is discussing that oft fraught dichotomy between true sovereign power a
 nd the needs for control over the various political branches.  
This is a salient discussion for the inquiry carried out by this essay because the discussion of the 
importance of electoral management and the elections process forms a judicially enforceable 
restraint that may also cross into the realm of the fundamental objectives necessary to inform and 
inspire governmental action. Finally, this constitution offers the federal character of the nation. 
This provision in §14(3) of Chapter II of the Constitution acknowledges that with the heterogenous 
population there have been issues with regards to composition of government agencies either 
favoring or disfavoring members of certain tribes or ethnic groups.77 
 
75 See B.O. NWABUEZE, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA, 253 (1982). 
76 See John Ademola Yakubu, Trends in Constitution-Making in Nigeria, 10 Transnat’l L. & Contemp. Probs. 449 (2000). 
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 In response to this, the federal character provision states,  
 
The composition of the Government of the Federation or any of its agencies and the 
conduct of its affairs shall be carried out in such manner as to reflect the federal character of 
Nigeria and the need to promote national unity, and also to command national loyalty 
thereby ensuring that there shall be no predominance of persons from a few States or from a 
few ethnic or other sectional groups in that government or in any of its agencies.78   
 
This provision is also important in establishing the issues to be faced by any national electoral 
commission going forward. The 1979 constitution did not address those issues itself, but the 1999 
constitution, which is still in force with amendments today, will.  
 
1999 Constitution and Current Amendments 
This constitution entered into force on May 29th, 1999. The 1999 constitution comes as an 
amendment to the 1979 constitution.79 In 1998, Gen. Abdulsalami Abubakar agreed to hand over 
power to a democratically elected civilian President in 1999.80 In the same year, he adopted the 1979 
Constitution as to be entered into force upon the successful completion of elections in 1999. In 
effort to carry out this promise, he created the Independent National Electoral Commission and 
appointed a former Supreme Court Justice, Ephraim Akpata to be its first chairman.81 The 1999 
constitution remained as the 1979 Constitution and adopted only a few amendments. It is under this 
constitution that  this inquiry finds grounds to appeal for constitutional guarantees for a democratic 
national election management process.  
 
 
The Nigerian Electoral Process  
The current Nigerian electoral process is best exemplified by looking at the process of the 
2019 general elections. The 2019 elections were "marred by violence and intimidation, with the role 
of the security agencies becoming more contentious as the process progressed.,” “this damaged the 
integrity of the electoral process and may deter future participation.”82 In the early hours of February 
16th, the Independent National Electoral Commission, (“INEC”) announced that the presidential 
and national assembly elections scheduled to take place that very day, were postponed to the 
following week. The Chairman of INEC, Mahmood Yakubu stated that “the commission came to 
the conclusion that proceeding with the election as scheduled is no longer feasible.”83 No 
further explanation was provided for this change. This change led to widespread accusations of 
corruption as the move was seen to greatly disadvantage the opposition party PDP as they 
had already spent large amounts of money ferrying agents all over the country to coordinate 
voting initiatives and had to spend more money to ensure they were present for the new election 
date. In contrast, the ruling party, APC, whose President Muhammadu Buhari was running for 
reelection, did not have to spend nearly as much because they relied on government institutions 
to coordinate their voting initiatives.84 The election related violence involved disruptions to 
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polling centers preventing complete collection of ballots and extending the voting in certain areas.85 
Incumbent President Buhari won his second term against his major opponent former Vice President 
Atiku Abubakar and his party, PDP.  
 
The issues in that election administration can be shown through a description of the 
Nigerian electoral process as it currently exists. Electoral governance involves the interaction of 
constitutional, legal and institutional rules and organizational practices that determine the basic rules 
for election procedures and electoral competition; organize campaigns, voter registration, and 
election day tallies; and resolve disputes and certify results.86 (cite Omotola 539) Thus, such 
electoral management boards are part of "a set of institutions and rules that together determine the 
probity of electoral processes and in emerging democracies, where administrative processes are weak 
and distrust across political actors is high, their role at the center of electoral processes tends to be 
more visible.”87 (cite Omotola 539)  
The Constitution lays out the functions, composition and powers of INEC. These are important to 
analyze as the Constitution is not the only source of INEC’s powers. In 2010, the national assembly 
passed the Electoral Act which provides for more powers, structure and formation for INEC as well 
as for state independent electoral commissions.88 As we will see, it  may be problematic what 
functions and powers are prescribed in the Constitution as opposed to in the Act.  
The 1999 Constitution establishes INEC under §153 while its functions and powers are 
outlined in the Third Schedule to the Constitution, part 1 item F, paragraphs 14 and 15. The 
Constitution provides that INEC  
 
a. “organize, undertake and supervise all elections to the offices of the President and Vice-
President, the Governor and Deputy Governor of a state and to the membership of the 
Senate, the House of Representatives and the Houses of Assembly of each State of the 
Federation;”  
b. register political parties in accordance with the provisions of this Constitution and an Act 
of the National Assembly; 
c. monitor the organization and operation of the political parties, including their finances;  
d. arrange for the annual examination and auditing of the funds and accounts of political 
parties , and publish a report on such examination and audit for public information;  
e. arrange and conduct the registration of persons qualified to vote and prepare, maintain 
and revise the register of voters for the purpose of any election under this Constitution 
f. monitor political campaigns and provide rules and regulations which shall govern the 
political parties;  
g. ensure that all Electoral Commissioners and Returning Officers take and subscribe the 
Oath of Office prescribed by law  
h. delegate any of its powers to any Resident Electoral Commissioner; and  
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The Constitution, therefore, highlights the core functions of INEC and also details the composition 
of the Commission. These include a Chairman and twelve other members called National Electoral 
Commissioners. The Chairman of INEC is to be appointed by the President subject to 
Senate approval and in consultation with the Council of State. A key update in the 1999 constitution 
is that it provides INEC with the power to delimit and create senatorial districts for election to the 
senate and the constituencies for the election to the House of Representatives.90 The Constitution 
otherwise maintains the independence of the electoral commission by stating that “in exercising its 
power to make appointments or to exercise disciplinary control over persons,…, the Independent 
National Electoral Commission shall not be subject to the direction or control of any other authority 
or person.”91 (§158) 
The Electoral Act of 2010 provides a broader definition of the powers and provides more rules 
and guidelines for INEC. This stems from (i) as stated in the Constitution. Thus, the national 
assembly has constitutional authority to regulate INEC. The relevant provisions in the Act include; 
civic and voter education, cancelling election results, maintenance of the voter register, print and 
issue of voter’s register and cards, issuance of duplicate voter cards, registration and deregistration of 
political parties, giving notice of elections, establishment of polling units, prosecution of 
electoral offenses.92  
  
The electoral process in the country is then wholly controlled by INEC who in turn is a 
creature of the Executive and the Legislature. The executive has primary control over 
appointment while the legislature maintains control over the more functional aspects. The 
Constitution, however, provides a substantive check. In 2018, the National Assembly 
proposed amendments to the 2010 Electoral Act.93 The changes they suggested involved scheduling 
the presidential election to follow the gubernatorial and state houses of assembly elections. The 
current Act allows for national assembly elections, presidential elections and then state house 
assembly and gubernatorial elections.94 However, the Constitution provides some discretion for 
INEC to select the timing of elections. Despite that fact, timing was prescribed in the Electoral Act 
and then sought to be amended in 2018 but then vetoed by the President on the grounds that it 
went against the Constitution. This back and forth shows that at base the Constitution is an 
important consideration because even with these rules, INEC still set its own schedule for 
the national elections providing for the presidential elections and national assembly elections taking 
place at the same time and the state house and gubernatorial election occurring the following month. 
Here, we see the impact of enshrining such powers in the Constitution.  
 
Factors Impacting Nigerian Elections 
 
The previous section noted the electoral process and which bodies are in charge of 
supervising and conducting the elections. For the major races, the entire process of the election 
from setting the time, registering the political parties, providing rules for campaigns, campaign 
financing, registering voters, organizing the actual voting, tallying the votes, releasing the results 
and prosecuting election offenses, is handled by one organization, INEC. This means that they wield 
a lot of power, however with the constant reports of election violence, particularly with the 
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accusations of election rigging, INEC is not fully able to complete its mandate. Here are the factors 
impacting the efficacy of INEC and Nigerian elections.  
 
 
Partisanship and Control  
The over-centralization of power is pertinent here. Due to the current structure of 
INEC’s powers, all parties in power have sought to maintain this equilibrium to ensure that INEC is 
particularly reliant on the whims of the Presidency to carry out its duties. As such, depending on the 
party in power, INEC’s guidelines may reflect a specific party’s intentions over the other. This was 
particularly the accusation by opposing parties during the 2019 election scandal. This also implies 
that partisan control provides structural limitations on INEC power, which it does. The primary area 
in this consideration is composition. In the constitution, the composition is dictated by the President 
with consultation from the Council of State and approval by the National Assembly, however this is 
not a true check on the Executive’s power to dominate the appointments process. It is still the case 
that the persons that the President selects are ultimately approved by the corresponding authorities.  
 
This is also because the President’s party is also the party in power at the legislative level. 
Thus, in order to ensure that these officials do not engage in partisan policymaking, there should be 
more restrictions imposed that determine who may be a viable candidate for the position. As this is 
only made clear for the Chairman, this solution should extend to the other members of the 
Commission particularly the regional commissioners. In addition to recommendations on the 
composition of the committee, job security also needs to be considered. Under the constitution, the 
Committee members may be removed for cause and are only in power for term of 5 years. This has 
been done twice before under the Babangida military regime and the Chairmen who were dismissed 
were both professors and they were dismissed for vague and questionable reasons.95 The first was 
Prof. Eme Awa, who was removed for his uncompromising stance on the management of the 
electoral commission, the second was Prof. Humphrey Nwosu who decided not to follow 
the military government’s decision to annul the 1993 presidential elections.96 This then leads to the 
issue of funding. Funding is important to establish true independence of the Commission. The 
constitution does not provide for an independent source of funding for the Commission, rather it is 
determined as a part of the executive branch budget determination. This leaves INEC entirely 
beholden to the express whims of the President or the party in power   to determine what functions 
it may carry out.  
 
Infrastructure  
As a result of the lack of funding, job security and independence, infrastructure is a 
major issue affecting the proper conduction and function of INEC. This includes the coordination 
of the bureaucracy and particularly, the on the ground implantation of the elections themselves. This 
tight control by the other branches of government has constrained the capability of INEC. It is now 
reliant on ad hoc staff to implement the electoral process. This is problematic because INEC is a 
federal body and a creature of the national constitution, there is a problem with gathering volunteers 
and with a lack of infrastructure, it is difficult to coordinate with state departments 
to organize people to work at the polls and to help with voter registration. This is such a problem 
that after almost every election, INEC has a tendency to lay some of the blame on their temporary 
staff.   
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Asides from factors relating to composition and structure of INEC, there are other 
extraconstitutional factors that adversely impact its effectivity in conducting elections. The 
most important of which involves reachability. Due to the landscape and geographical formations 
across the state, there are some parts that are far more difficult to reach than others which 
exacerbates the problems of funding and ad hoc staff. This also dovetails into the security issues in 
certain regions of the country. In the middle between the Northern and Southern sections of the 
country, the Middle Belt region is besieged by attacks from nomadic herdsmen, in the far 
northeastern region, Boko Haram has maintained a stranglehold on the people and resources of the 
region.97 As a result of Boko Haram’s terrorist activities in the region, large numbers of people have 
been forced from their homes thus leading to a huge internal displaced persons issue in 
the surrounding states in the region. Finally, in the southern Delta region, there are environmental 
issues related to oil spills in the region rendering many people in the area homeless.98 All these 
factors affect the reachability of these individuals and lead election results to not be representative of 
the public at large.  
 
Future Outlook 
This section seeks to analyze how these issues may be dealt with using the main tool 
identified in the previous sections, that is, constitutional tinkering. It has been demonstrated 
that constitutional tinkering may provide a broader means of evaluating the effectiveness of the 
democratic institutions being employed by the state. It has also been shown that constitutions form 
an important part of government and have remarkable staying power particularly within West 
African states. In Nigeria, there needs to be a serious reorganization of INEC to provide for certain 
constitutional guarantees. The justifications for these not only arise from the theories discussed in 
previous sections of this paper but from the general tenets of international law which will be 
discussed below.  
 
A Constitutionally Regulated INEC  
The major question here is a discussion as to whether this constitutional change would go in 
the direction of a more centralized or a more decentralized set of rules surrounding electoral 
commissions. This is an important discussion as it defines the structure by which INEC would 
operate. Looking at the issues illustrated above, there are clear benefits to engaging in a 
decentralized set of rules in order to reduce the possibility of partisan control by the 
federal government. It will encourage greater civic participation in the conduct of elections and 
allow for innovations in different areas in not only the conduct of elections but voter registration, 
education, etc. It might follow the example of other countries such as the UK and the US, both of 
which allow for local governments to conduct their elections.99 Thus, not only would 
decentralization encourage the participation of the public at large in the conduct of elections but 
may also reduce the costs of having to hire more official rather than ad hoc staff for such a 
limited purpose. Finally, decentralization may cure concerns of public distrust in the institution 
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and tribal affiliation. In order to achieve this however, INEC needs stricter regulation enshrined in 
the Constitution, in addition to stricter protections for state independent electoral commissions. In 
the constitution needs to be strict guarantees on funding, job security and delegations of power, in 
particular provisions that stipulate the decentralization of the election operations headed by the 
Independent National Electoral Commission. In practice, this requires an evaluation of the most 
effective and efficient means of delineating the exact process of engaging in a decentralization 
mechanism that is able to promote the operation and capabilities of democratic institutions in  the 
state. The Constitution is not the only means through which electoral reform may be carried out. 
There are certain advances in technology that are currently being tried out by local governments in 
local elections that have been very successful. There is an argument that a broader controlled 
attempt on a national scale may be equally successful.100  
 
The International Independent electoral commission 
In international law, there is not a lot of scholarship for what the standards should be in this 
field. This is mostly because of the following reasons; electoral management bodies are seen as 
distinct creatures of the state and it is difficult to frame an international framework based on vastly 
different local standards. However, there is some consensus in the international community on 
the distinct function of electoral management bodies and their impact on the function of other 
democratic institutions. The main conclusion is that newer democracies tend to trend towards 
independent committees with centralized power. However, as pointed out in the previous section, it 
may be even more stabilizing for there to be a decentralized set of rules surrounding electoral 
management boards. The important emphasis here is not only the independence of these electoral 
institutions but an independence that is defined in terms of funding, appointment, job security 
and infrastructure. A standard for electoral committees must emphasize independence above all else. 
It is in this manner that true democracy may be guaranteed such that it reflects public opinion.101  
 
Conclusion  
This paper has argued for the firm inclusion in the Nigerian Constitution certain safeguards 
to protect the integrity of the Independent National Electoral Commission. In highlighting this 
aspect, this paper analyzed the importance of constitutions, their staying power and the particular 
implications this has for relatively newer democracies in West Africa. In that vein, there is much 
more to be said on the impact of constitutional change on democratic institutions. However, this 
paper shows that with regards to electoral systems, such constitutional guarantees are necessary to 
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